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Every issuance of a note, a share of stock, or any other security is
potentially subject to the securities or blue sky laws. If no exemption
is applicable, registration of the security is required. Issuance and sale
without required registration permit buyers to recover their pur-
chase money and have other serious consequences.
Exemptions suitable for small offerings exist in many states' and
are undoubtedly the most widely used. They tend to leave business-
men in closely held corporations oblivious of the applicability of the
securities laws. And they are taken for granted by many lawyers who
are unfamiliar with their peculiarities.
This Article reviews the Texas small offering exemptions,' which
were amended substantially in 1963.' The sources of interpretation
are (1) direct statutory analysis, (2) impressions and experiences of
practitioners, and (3) discussions with the Texas Securities Commis-
sioner and his staff.' This explains the absence of conventional cita-
'For discussion and tabulation of the various provisions, see Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky
Law 81-83, 369-74 (1958). Corresponding federal exemptions are summarized in 4.6 of
the text of this Article.
a The discussion is limited to exemptions available to the corporate issuer. Substantially
the same treatment is accorded to the noncorporate issuer (e.g., partnership, trust, or joint
stock company). Related exemptions for outstanding securities include §§ 5.C(l) for the
investor and 5.0 for the dealer. For oil and gas interests, see § 5.Q which has features re-
sembling both § 5.1(a) and § 51(c).4 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1963, ch. 170, § 4, at 474.
SAn earlier version of this Article had the thoughtful and valuable comment of the
Texas Securities Commissioner (William M. King), his Deputy (Truman G. Holladay),
and members of their staff, as well as Marvin S. Sloman and George Slover, Jr. of the Dallas
Bar and Frank M. Wozencraft of the Houston Bar. Although the Commissioner's views
often have been mentioned and I have tried to state them accurately, the opinions and
analysis are my own responsibility.
I should like to use this opportunity to salute the State Securities Board, the Com-
missioner, and the staff for their vigorous and intelligent administration of the Act. They
have performed the exceedingly difficult task of being scrupulous servants of the public
interest, yet have been able and willing to listen to the needs of business and, wherever
proper, to cooperate in satisfying them.
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tion for many statements. The Article also considers some aspects of
the related federal exemptions. It closes with an estimate of how
widely small offering exemptions are used and an inquiry into the
policies underlying them.
1. THE " 3 5-MAN EXEMPTION"-SECTION 5.1 (a)
1.1 General
The familiar' "3S-Man Exemption" for "the sale by any corpora-
tion of its securities .. .where the total . ..stockholders will not
thereafter exceed thirty-five . . ." has been modified only slightly by
the 1963 amendment. It now reads "the sale of any security by the
issuer thereof so long as the total number of security holders ... does
not exceed thirty-five."' The main change was from "stockholders"
to "security holders." The purpose was to eliminate doubts created
by an Attorney General's dictum' that the word "stockholders" limit-
ed the exemption to sales of stock as opposed to debt. The 1963
amendment makes it clear that all forms of securities may be sold
under the exemption. There is no limit on the dollar volume or num-
ber of shares. This is the exemption under which most closely held
corporations are formed and capitalized.
1.2 How To Count To Thirty-Five
The number of security holders at the conclusion of the offering
is determinative, not the number of sales. Thus, several sales to the
same buyer are counted only once. Similarly, the exemption is ex-
hausted when the number of security holders reaches thirty-five, re-
' History. The first act extending registration to securities in general, Tex. Gen. & Spec.
Laws 1923, ch. 52, at 114 (former arts. 579-600, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925)), appar-
ently had no small offering exemption. Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1935, ch. 100 (former art.
600a, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1953)), §§ 3(j) and 3(k), at 255, provided exemptions
for corporate sales of stock or other securities up to 25 holders, and for noncorporate sales
up to 10 members. A prohibition on the use of agents and salesmen for corporate securities
was dropped when the 1935 exemptions were carried forward by Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws
1955, ch. 67, §§ 3(j) and 3(k), at 325-26 (former art. 579-3(j) and (k), Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1955)). Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws 1957, ch. 269, § 5.1 at 580 (former art.
581-5.1, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957)), combined the corporate and noncorporate
exemptions and raised the limit to 35: "The sale by any corporation of its securities or by
any unincorporated association or partnership of interests, where the total membership or
stockholders will not thereafter exceed thirty-five (35), and where the sale is made without
the use of advertisements or any form of public solicitation." The 1957 changes in this
exemption are considered in Meer, The Texas Securities Act-1957 Model: Facelift or
Forward Look?, 36 Texas L. Rev. 429, 434-35, 444-45 (1958). See also Comment, Exemp-
tions to the Securities Act of 1957 and Their Importance to Persons Dealing in Oil and
Gas Interests, 12 Sw. L.J. 359, 365-66 (1958).
'Section 5.1(a). The full text is: "Provided such sale is made without any public so-
licitation or advertisements, (a) the sale of any security by the issuer thereof so long as
the total number of security holders of the issuer thereof does not exceed thirty-five (35)
persons after taking such sale into account."
'Op. Att'y Gen. (Tex.) WW-564 (March 3, 1959), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5 70412.
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gardless of how many sales the corporation has made. For example,
the corporation might sell to twenty-five and stop. If the number
of security holders increases to thirty-five by "osmosis" (gifts, be-
quests, resales, etc. by the holders), the exemption no longer is avail-
able. On the other hand, a corporation might sell to thirty-five and
stop. If the number of holders later is reduced to twenty-five by sales
among existing holders or by resales to the corporation, the corpora-
tion then can sell to ten more.
It is not entirely clear whether sales past thirty-five destroy the
exemption for all or only for the thirty-sixth purchaser and beyond.
The statute speaks in the singular, using "sale" twice. This suggests
that each transaction stands on its own and that excessive sales to
additional security holders will not contaminate the first thirty-five.'
However, it is quite possible that the question may be answered in
terms of the "issue concept" that has grown up in federal law."0 By
this view, no part of an issue would be exempt if sold to more than
thirty-five, but sale of a second issue beyond thirty-five would not
affect a first issue within this limit.
a. Location The location of the security holders is immaterial. All
must be counted, even though some might be outside the state or
might have bought in transactions beyond the jurisdiction of the
Texas Act.
b. Security Holders In one respect the 1963 version is narrower
than its 1957 predecessor. Formerly, the exemption was valid for
thirty-five stockholders. Now it is good only to thirty-five security
holders, including holders of debt securities as well as stock." Thus,
a company with ten noteholders and twenty-five stockholders no
longer can use the exemption; previously the company could have
used it to sell stock to ten more stockholders. A person who is both
a noteholder and a stockholder presumably is counted only once. It
appears necessary to count the bank to which the corporation has
given a short-term note and the insurance company to which it has
given a mortgage note. These notes are securities' and fall literally
9 See Comment, Exemptions to the Securities Act of 1957 and Their Importance to Per-
sons Dealing in Oil and Gas Interests, 12 Sw. L.J. 359, 365-66 (1958). Of course, the num-
ber of sales may be so great as to demonstrate that there was public solicitation; in this
case, the exemption fails. See text, 4.1 infra.
"0 Roughly speaking, securities belong to different "issues" if they are different classes
(e.g., common v. preferred, stocks v. bonds) or "if they constitute separate plans of financ-
ing in time and circumstances." 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 578 (2d ed. 1961). The latter
involves a difficult fact determination. For a summary of the SEC's views, see SEC Secur-
ities Act of 1933 Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2770-83,
at 2684.
"This returns to the 193 5-57 pattern when all security holders were counted together.
See note 6 supra.
1 Section 4.A.
[Vol. 18
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within the enumeration, even though their issuance is separately
exempt as sales to financial institutions a or of commercial paper.'
Open account creditors need not be counted, but trade creditors who
hold notes or acceptances probably should be. In this state of affairs,
it may be possible to reinforce the exemption by paying off notes
before making certain stock sales or by postponing some borrowings
until stock sales are completed.
c. Beneficial Owners Uncertainty remains about beneficial (non-
record) owners. One stockholder of record who really is holding for
himself and two others should be counted as three. Otherwise the
small number becomes a mockery and the presumed grounds for the
exemption1 are defeated. The difficulty, of course, is that the cor-
poration may not know anything beyond the record ownership.
There is reason to think that the corporation has a duty of inquiry
on this matter. In any event, the corporation is well advised to obtain
an investment letter to the effect that each purchaser is taking solely
for his own account. A corporation so acting in good faith (i.e., with
no reason to doubt the truth of the letter) should be protected. But
prompt resales increasing the number of holders beyond thirty-five
will raise serious questions as to the validity of the exemption in the
first place.
d. Partnerships and Corporations Since a partnership is an entity
for most purposes (including property ownership)," 0 it normally
should be counted as one security holder, even though there are
several partners. This assumes that the partnership exists in good faith
for other purposes, and that it was not formed merely to circum-
vent the numerical limits of the exemption. A recently created part-
nership, or one with no substantial business activities, will be suspect.
Sellers to partnerships under this exemption may want to consider
transfer restrictions to counteract the easy distribution of partner-
ship assets to partners. Sales to corporations should be regarded simi-
larly, but with even greater emphasis on the separate entity.
e. Trusts In the case of a voting trust, the Commissioner's position
is understood to be that each beneficial owner must be counted. On
1a Section 5.H.
1 Section 6.H. The result is somewhat absurd: reducing the scope of one exemption
because of transactions otherwise exempt, presumably on separate policy grounds. See text,
5.1 - 5.3 infra. I doubt that this was "intended" in any realistic sense. But it is difficult to
escape the negative implication of § 5.I(c), which expressly excludes from its count all
sales and securities exempt under other provisions. See text, 3.5 infra. The Commissioner is
unlikely to take action if 35 is exceeded only by a bank note, but this is no assurance
against rescission suits by purchasers. See text, 4.8 infra.
15 See text, 5.1-5.3 infra.
"0 Bromberg, Source and Comments to Texas Uniform Partnership Act, 17 Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. 234-36 (1962).
1964]
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the other hand, a testamentary or inter vivos trust used for genuine
family purposes should be counted as one, regardless of the number
of beneficiaries.
f. Husband and Wife If a security is community property, is the
marital community counted as one holder or two? Practice here has
been to say one, because only one investment decision has been made
(through the husband's managerial powers)." The Commissioner
agrees with this view. However, if a buyer sued, the seller might
have difficulty sustaining this position against the general rule that
each spouse has an equal, vested interest in the community property."8
The issuer's position is stronger if the security is registered in the
name of one spouse rather than both.
g. Optionees Another troublesome problem is whether optionees
are to be counted. There can be little doubt that most options are
securities." But it is understood to be the Commissioner's position that
only optionees who purchased their options must be counted. This is
consistent with the purpose of the act to protect purchasers. Em-
ployees who are granted options as part of their compensation have
been classified separately for purposes of the Employee Option Ex-
emption (see below). It is reasonable to think they are distinct for
this purpose too and need not be counted toward the thirty-five.
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960) provides that "during coverture the
common property of the husband and wife may be disposed of by the husband only .... "
This lighthearted solution in terms of a single investment decision ignores the intricate
community property problems of management and ownership which are present. Huic,
Commentary on the Community Property Law of Texas, 13 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 1,
5-11, 34-45 (1960); Smith, Legislative Note: 1963 Amendments Affecting Married Women's
Rights in Texas, 18 Sw. L.J. 70 (1964). On the other hand, it has long been the business
custom to look primarily to record ownership. It is common knowledge that most record
owners are individuals, that most individuals old enough to own securities are married, and
that most property of Texas married couples is community property. In the face of this
situation, of which the legislature must have been as aware as anyone else, it is not un-
reasonable to conclude that the marital community was intended to be treated as one. If
a contrary result was intended, it might well have been specified by the legislature.
" All property acquired during marriage is community property except that acquired
by gift, devise, or descent. Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4613,
4619 (1960), 4614 (Supp. 1963); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
See Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961), for a graphic illustration of
the strength of the joint interest.
" The federal and Uniform acts include options as securities in the phrase "warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase" other securities. Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 48 Stat.
74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1958); Uniform Securities Act § 401(1). There
is nothing so specific in the Texas Act; if options are embraced, it is by catch-all language
such as "any other instrument commonly known as a security." § 4.A. Although authority
from other jurisdictions is dubious because of differences in statutory definitions (of "secur-
ity," "sale," and "offer") and litigation context, the pattern seems to be to treat options as
securities even though not explicitly so defined. See Link, Petter & Co. v. Pollie, 241 Mich.
356, 217 N.W. 60 (1928); Haddad v. Electronic Prod. & Dev., Inc., 33 Cal. Rptr. 89
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963) and cases there cited. On the other hand, some corporate lawyers
feel that an option is not a security under the Texas Act if it is nontransferable and is not
evidenced by a separate certificate (e.g., if it is embodied in a contract for employment or
for the sale of a business).
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h. Conclusion One can only conclude that it is imprudent to push
this exemption to the limit. Stopping at, say, thirty not only gives
leeway for an overlooked beneficial owner or for a bank to which a
note has been given, it also may be welcome evidence of good faith in
a civil suit or an administrative proceeding.
2. THE EMPLOYEE OPTION EXEMPTION-SECTION 5.1 (b)
2.1 General
A new exemption was added in 1963 for "sales of shares of stock
pursuant to the grant of an employees' restricted stock option as
defined in the Internal Revenue Laws of the United States.""0 This
exemption facilitates employee stock ownership and legitimizes a
common type of transaction often formerly made in violation of
the act. Although options usually are given only to "key" employees,
this exemption places no limit on the number or kind of employees
or on the number of shares optioned. Thus, it is not truly a small
offering exemption.
The exemption does not cover sales to employees apart from
options, or sales pursuant to other kinds of options. If these are
exempt, it must be under some other provision; either the 35-Man
or the 15 -a-Year Exemption may be used in appropriate instances.
2.2 Effect Of Tax Laws
Because the exemption refers to the tax laws, the latter must be
satisfied if the exemption is to apply. This means meeting numerous
tax requirements including nontransferability, maximum ten-year
duration of option, and minimum exercise price of eighty-five per
cent of market value at the time of grant.'
a. 1964 Tax Changes The language used in the Texas Act ("re-
stricted stock options") is now confined by the tax law, with very
limited exceptions, to options granted before 1964." In its place are
recognized two kinds of options, called "qualified stock options"''
and "employee stock purchase plans."' Each of these is stricter in
some respects than the former "restricted stock option." The "quali-
fied" option has a maximum duration of five years (instead of ten)
and a minimum exercise price of one hundred per cent of market
value at date of grant (instead of eighty-five per cent) ; this option
also requires shareholder approval and its exercise must be expressly
'
0 Section 5.1(b).
21 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 421(d) (prior to amendment by Revenue Act of 1964).
22 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 424(b), added by Revenue Act of 1964.
23 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 422, added by Revenue Act of 1964.
24 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §423, added by Revenue Act of 1964.
1964]
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limited while prior options are outstanding." The "employee stock
purchase plans" resemble the old "restricted stock options," but are
narrower in many respects and must be granted to all employees in a
nondiscriminatory fashion." Both the new plans are available only
to employees, retain limits on options to major shareholders, and re-
quire that options be nontransferable.
b. Old Options Options granted before 1964 still may be exercised
under the exemption, for they are within the literal language of the
Texas Act.
c. New Options Options granted after 1963 raise more complex
questions. If they are granted under plans which satisfied the old tax
law but do not comply with the new, their exercise may be literally
exempt. But they no longer coordinate with the tax law, and this
may be grounds for destroying the exemption. Obviously the thing
to do is update the plan or adopt a new one to satisfy the new tax
law.
Options granted after 1963 under plans which meet the new tax
law should qualify for the exemption. Any such option would have
satisfied the old tax law, and it will fulfill the legislature's coordi-
nation purpose. In addition, such an option is more consonant with
the Texas Securities Act because of the protection afforded by the
new tax requirements already discussed (e.g., shareholder approval,
shorter duration, higher price, and nondiscrimination).
The State Securities Board, on May 22, 1964, interpreted "re-
stricted stock option" to include "qualified stock purchase options
and employees' stock purchase plans under the Internal Revenue
Code as amended January [February] 1964" as well as "restricted
stock options granted before 1964." A clarifying amendment by
the legislature would be desirable.
2.3 Granting Of Options
The Securities Act is regarded as inapplicable to the grant of an
employees' restricted stock option (as distinct from the offering of
stock pursuant to the option). Although there must be considera-
tion (e.g., continued services) for the option to be valid in corporate
"'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 422(b), added by Revenue Act of 1964. Additional re-
quirements are imposed on the holder (rather than on the form of the option) if he de-
sires capital gain treatment. In particular, he must hold the stock three years after exer-
cising the option (instead of six months from exercise or two years from grant, whichever is
later). Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 422(a) (1), added by Revenue Act of 1964.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 423 (b), added by Revenue Act of 1964.
[Vol. 18
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law," it generally has been thought to involve no "value" in the
securities law sense. Since the Securities Act applies to sales and since
sales are defined in terms of disposition for "value,"" s the act does
not apply to the grant of the typical employee option.
The number of options granted may be limited in practice by
other considerations. Because of their dilution potential, options
may prevent a later public offering from meeting the "fair, just
and equitable" test for registration."9 Although the official State-
ment of Policy says merely that employee options are justified "if
reasonable in number and method of exercise,""0 the rule of thumb
seems to be that unexercised options should not exceed ten per cent
of outstanding shares.
3. THE "1 5-A-YEAR" EXEMPTION-SECTION 5J. (C)
3.1 General
A badly needed" exemption was added in 1963 for "the sale by
an issuer of its securities during the period of twelve (12) months
ending with the date of the sale in question to not more than fifteen
(15) persons . . . provided such persons purchased . . . for their
"'See, e.g., Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652
(Sup. Ct. 1952), petition for reargument denied, 33 Del. Ch. 174, 91 A.2d 62 (Sup. Ct.
1952), later proceedings on remand, 33 Del. Ch. 395, 94 A.2d 217 (Ch. 1953); and cases
collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 852, 855-67 (1954).
" Section 4.E. For further consideration of "value" in the definition of "sale" under
the Federal Securities Act, see Bromberg, Corporate Liquidation and Securities Law-Prob-
lems in the Distribution of Portfolio Securities, 3 B. Coll. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1, 3-6, 12
(1961).
"' Section 10.A.
' State Securities Board, Statement of Policy Regarding Options and Warrants (undated,
issued early 1960, amended Oct. 29, 1962), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. 46612, at 42506. "War-
rants or . . . options . . . must be justified by the applicant" for registration. Ibid.
Board Statements. Although the administration of the Securities Act is vested in the
Commissioner, § 3, the Board may exercise any power or perform any act authorized to
the Commissioner, § 2.B. The Commissioner is appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of,
the Board. § 2.B. Formal statements of policy, in practice, are published in the name of
the Board rather than of the Commissioner.
The act gives no rule-making power to the Commissioner or the Board, and their pro-
nouncements lack the force of law. The Attorney General has ruled that the Commissioner
has authority to notify the industry what factors he will take into consideration. Op.
Att'y Gen. (Tex.) WW-951 (Oct. 18, 1960), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5 70504.
The Board's statements invariably are helpful. It is regrettable that statements have
not been issued on more points, and that those issued have not been as widely disseminated
as they might have been, e.g., through the commercial publishers of blue sky law services.
81 Committee on Securities and Investment Banking of the Section on Corp. Bank. and
Bus. Law of the State Bar of Texas, Comment-1963 Amendment [to § 5.1], 1B Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. 18 (1964): "The urgent need for some form of private placement exemp-
tion in the Texas Securities Act, such as exists in the Federal and Uniform Securities
Acts, has been apparent for some time. Under the previous law no such exemption existed
once the corporation reaches 35 stockholders." See also Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 372
(1958); Hill, Pitfalls in the Texas Securities Act, 10 Sw. L.J. 265 (1956), discussing the
case which painfully dramatized the need, Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704
(1956).
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own account and not for distribution."3 This exemption is designed
primarily for private placement by a corporation which has ex-
hausted its 35-Man Exemption. It may be used by a publicly held
company. It applies to any kind of securities in any amount and
may be used repeatedly at twelve-month intervals (e.g., sales to
fifteen on January 5 of one year and sales to another fifteen on
January 6 of the next year). Or it can be employed more or less
continuously, so long as the total in the latest twelve months does
not exceed fifteen. Thus, it would cover one sale a month for an in-
definite period."
" Section 5.1(c). The full text is:
Provided such sale is made without any public solicitation or advertisements
(c) the sale by an issuer of its securities during the period of twelve (12)
months ending with the date of the sale in question to not more than fif-
teen (15) persons (excluding, in determining such fifteen (15) persons,
purchasers of securities in transactions exempt under other provisions of this
Section 5, purchasers of securities exempt under Section 6 hereof and pur-
chasers of securities which are part of an offering registered under Section 7
hereof), provided such persons purchased such securities for their own ac-
count and not for distribution.
The issuer shall file a notice not less than five (5) days prior to the date
of consummation of any sale claimed to be exempt under the provisions of
clause (c), of this Subsection I, setting forth the name and address of the
issuer, the total amount of the securities to be sold under this clause, the price
at which the securities are to be sold, the date on which the securities are to
be sold, the names and addresses of the proposed purchasers, and such other
information as the Commissioner may reasonably require, including a cer-
tificate of a principal officer of the issuer that reasonable information con-
cerning the plan of business and the financial condition of the issuer has been
furnished to the proposed purchasers. The Commissioner may by order re-
voke or suspend the exemption under this clause (c) with respect to any se-
curity if he has reasonable cause to believe that the plan of business of the
issuer of such security, the security, or the sale thereof would tend to work
a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser or purchasers thereof, such order to be
subject to review in the manner provided by Section 24 of this Act. The rev-
ocation or suspension of this exemption shall be inapplicable to the issuer
until such issuer shall have received actual notice from the Commissioner
of such revocation or suspension.
The provision is patterned on Uniform Securities Act § 402 (b) (9) and Illinois Securi-
ties Law of 1953, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121Y2, § 137.4G (Smith-Hurd 1960). See also Mo.
Ann. Stat § 409.050(9) (Supp. 1963).
" Date of Sale. The sale of corporate securities by the issuer usually involves this se-
quence: negotiation; agreement on terms (i.e., making of contract of sale or to sell); pay-
ment; execution and authentication of the security; and delivery. Which of these fixes
the date of sale? In close cases, the dates of earlier and later sales may become critical. The
Act is silent on when a sale is made, so the issue is left to general law. Nothing seems to be
directly in point, and the possible analogies lead to diverse solutions:
(A) Corporate statutes frequently provide that stock is deemed issued when proper
consideration is paid. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act. Ann. art. 2.16A (1956); ABA-ALI Model Bus.
Corp. Act § 18 (1953). Provisions of this kind make execution, authentication, and de-
livery of certificates immaterial. They suggest that a sale typically is made when payment
is received by the corporation. However, the payment generally must be of consideration
fixed by the directors. Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 2.15A-C (1956); ABA-ALI
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 17 (1953). Consequently, directors' action fixing the considera-
tion may date the sale if it occurs after payment is received. Since these provisions apply
only to shares of stock, they offer no guidance for debt securities. One blue sky case,
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3.2 The Investment Requirement
This is the first time an explicit investment requirement has ap-
peared in the Texas Act. It is found in the language "for their own
account and not for distribution." Without such a requirement,
any numerical limit is illusory. The criterion is the buyer's subjec-
tive intent to invest for the long haul rather than to trade or to
speculate for the short run. Nonetheless, many persons (buyers and
though not involving a corporate security, confirms the irrelevance of delivery. In Davis v.
Walker, 170 Neb. 891. 104 N.W.2d 479 (1960), the sale of a working interest in an oil
well was complete on the day a contract of sale was executed and payment made, not the
following month when an operating agreement was delivered. Accordingly, no recovery
could be had under the Blue Sky Law which became effective after the first date but
before the second. See also Athas v. Day, 186 F. Supp. 385 (D. Colo. 1960), concerning
limitations under the Securities Act of 1933. In that case a sale of outstanding securities
was made when certificates and assignments were delivered by the seller to the buyer and
payment was given by the buyer to the seller, not several months later when the certifi-
cates were transferred on the corporate books.
(B) Debt securities are often negotiable instruments, in which case a contract for their
sale is "incomplete and revocable" until delivery. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
§ 16; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5932, § 16 (1962). Delivery in some instances may
be constructive rather than actual. Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law S 191; Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5948, § 191 (1962).
(C) The Uniform Sales Act, largely a codification of common law, gives the presumption
that property in unascertained or future goods passes when the goods "in a deliverable state
are unconditionally appropriated to the contract." Uniform Sales Act 5 19, Rule 4(1).
Although it seems clear that unissued securities are unascertained or future goods if se-
curities are goods, there is conflict on the latter point. See cases cited IA Uniform Laws
Ann. 425 n. 11 (1950). If securities are goods, then execution and authentication should
fix the date of the sale if they include registration in the owner's name because this is
plainly an appropriation to the contract. In the case of debt securities payable to bearer,
delivery appears to be the critical element, because there is not likely to be any prior appro-
priation. And see 2 Williston, Sales 60 n. 5 (1948), considering early holdings that one
entitled to unissued securities may transfer an interest in them that is effective on his
receipt of the securities without need of delivery by him to the transferee.
(D) The more recent and comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code lays down the
general rule that title to goods passes when the seller completes physical delivery. Uniform
Commercial Code § 2-401(2). But Uniform Commercial Code § 2-105(1) specifies that
securities ("investment securities") are not goods. However, this exclusion is not intended
to prevent application of the Sales portion of the Code (article 2) by analogy when sensible
and not superseded by article 8 dealing with investment securities. Uniform Commercial
Code, Comment to § 2-105. Article 8 is silent on when a sale is made in the original issue
of securities, so it appears that article 2 will apply and that physical delivery is decisive.
If article 8 is employed by analogy, the result is the same, for delivery is essential to the
transfer of title in an outstanding security. Uniform Commercial Code 5 8-301 (1). Accord:
Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 1; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1302-6.02 (1962).
One should not overlook the possibility that the date is computed differently for earlier
and later sales. Section 2.E may permit this since it defines "sale" to include (among many
other things) solicitations, contracts of sale, and transfers. The worst theory which results
is that the earlier sales were not made until the securities were delivered, but that the later
one was made when solicitation began. Symmetry and consistency weigh strongly against
this argument. So does the language of § 5.1 which calls for notice to the Commissioner
of when and how the securities are "to be sold." Since we have observed that negotiations
and commitments are permitted before the notice (see text accompanying note 41, infra) it
would be virtually impossible to regard solicitation as a "sale" for this purpose. However,
it remains possible that the sale was marked by delivery in the earlier instance and payment
in the later. Since only a few days separate contract, payment, and delivery in most cases,
caution in planning calls for taking the most unfavorable combination of dates.
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lawyers alike) try to deal with the problem in terms of how long
the security must be held. The Texas Commissioner, in his first
published form' for use under the section, said thirteen months, but
no time limit appears in the current version of the form."
Federal precedents under the private offering exemption (from
which the concept is drawn) permit no fixed limits. The federal
idea is holding for an indefinite period unless there is a material
change of circumstances not foreseeable at the time of purchase. "
There was a stage when one year seemed like a good rule of thumb.
Although there are current rumblings about five years, the predomi-
nant view is two years." This view appears relatively safe, provided
it is not applied automatically but is considered with other factors
(e.g., changing circumstances).
A private offering purchaser under federal law is not wholly
locked in. He may resell to other persons who bought in the same
offering, if they have the requisite investment intent. He may sell
to third parties who have appropriate investment intent so long
as the totality does not amount to a "distribution" (public offer-
ing). Or he may sell to the public at large if his securities are reg-
istered properly. These possibilities in general should carry over to
the Texas situation."
As a practical matter, resales are not a problem unless there is a
public interest in the security or unless one quickly develops. Really
closely held companies rarely will have to worry. But publicly held
companies may want to take extra precautions (such as transfer
restrictions or large denomination securities) in utilizing this ex-
' State Securities Board, Issuer's Notice of Sales under Section 5.1(c) Article 581,
Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, The Securities Act of Texas at 2 (undated, issued about
Sept. 1963).
" State Securities Board, Issuer's Notice for Exemption to Sell Securities under Section
5.1(c) Article 581, Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, The Securities Act of Texas (un-
dated, issued early 1964).
38 See 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 665-73; SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No.
4552, Nov. 6, 1962, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95 2770-83; Israels, Some Commercial Over-
tones of Private Placement, 45 Va. L. Rev. 851 (1959). The statutory language of the
federal private offering exemption is "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering." Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), second clause, 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
5 77d(1), second clause (1958).
" See Practising Law Institute, S.E.C. Problems of Controlling Stockholders and in
Underwritings 29-31 (Israels ed. 1962).
" The first two situations correspond roughly with § 5.C(1) which exempts certain
nonissuer, nondealer sales "in the ordinary course of bona fide personal investment . . . or
change in such investment." The sales must not be "in the course of repeated and successive
transactions of a like character." Ibid. This language effectively precludes a public offering,
at least by a person in control of the issuer. Section 5.0, exempting secondary trading in
certain outstanding securities, applies only to registered dealers. Thus, although the Texas
Act nowhere expressly requires registration of outstanding privately placed securities before
they are publicly distributed, it impliedly permits registration, and probably requires it in
the case of controlling persons.
[Vol. 18
TEXAS SMALL OFFERINGS EXEMPTIONS
emption. At the least, the issuer must obtain from each buyer a
statement that he is taking for his own account and not for dis-
tribution. (The Commissioner's form of noticea requires submission
of the form of investment letter.) It remains to be seen how far be-
hind this statement the issuer must inquire, or what happens to the
exemption if the buyer does distribute later on. The issuer (as noted
in 1.2 supra) ought to be protected if it acts in good faith and with
reasonable diligence. But it cannot rely blindly on the formality of an
"investment letter.""0
3.3 The Notice Requirement
Unlike other exemptions, this one involves notice to the Commis-
sioner. It must be given five days before "consummation" of sale. This
permits negotiations and some kind of commitments before filing.
Otherwise it would be impossible to supply the information called
for in the notice, e.g., names and addresses of proposed purchasers
and the date on which the securities are to be sold.4'
The Commissioner is authorized to require additional information.
Under this provision, his form of notice' calls for considerable
data, including: financial statements (audited if available, other-
wise certified by the principal financial officer), a description of the
plan of business, counsel's opinion on validity of the issue, and the
relation of each purchaser to the issuer or to its officers and directors.
The Commissioner's form of notice, though not mandatory,
should be used; it may be obtained by writing to the State Securities
Board, P.O. Box 12306, Capital Station, Austin 11. The need for
advance filing deserves re-emphasis." There is no provision for curing
by later action.
3.4 The Information Requirement
Federal law has set the pattern that small offering exemptions are
available only to persons who have access to relevant investment infor-
mation." To safeguard the exemption (and to avoid making material
omissions which might lead to civil liability), it has become customary
to supply private offering purchasers with a substantial amount of in-
3' See note 35 su hra.
"For the same proposition in federal law, see SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No.
4552, Nov. 6, 1962, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 55 2770-83, at 2683; In re The Crowell-
Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 3825, Aug. 12, 1957, CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 76539 (Transfer Binder, 1957-61 Decisions).
"' Section 5.1, second paragraph.
42 See note 35 supra.
43 In May, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner stated that § 5.1(c) filings were being made
at the rate of about five a week. To that date, only one had been rejected.
"SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
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formation about the company, the security, finances, etc. The Texas
Act has picked up this practice somewhat obliquely by requiring the
notice to contain a certification that "reasonable information con-
cerning the plan of business and the financial condition of the issuer
has been furnished to the proposed purchasers."'" The Commissioner's
form of notice"6 implements this and requires inclusion of all ma-
terial furnished to the buyers. Although not everything included in
the notice form need be given to buyers, most of the things listed in
it are relevant. Often it will be simpler to give all of the data to the
buyers rather than to decide what can be omitted safely.
3.5 How To Count To Fifteen
The statute expressly excludes from the count sales that are exempt
under other sections (but not other subsections of 5.1), e.g., sales to
financial institutions,7 sales to existing security holders," certain re-
organizations and acquisitions,4' sales of exempt securities," and sales
of registered securities." The exemption, then, is essentially for sales
to individuals or nonfinancial corporations. It is possible to make an
exempt private placement just before or just after a registered public
offering, in connection with a pre-emptive offering or in conjunction
with an institutional financing. The fifteen, however, does include
sales under the 35-Man and the Employee Option Exemptions. So a
corporation which sells to thirty-five security holders immediately on
organization must wait twelve months before using the 15-a-Year
Exemption. Or if it sells stock to five employees on options during a
given twelve months, a corporation can sell to only ten others under
the 15-a-Year Exemption.
The legislative intent to stop at fifteen beneficial owners (regard-
less of record ownership) is manifest in the requirement that each
buyer take for his own account and not for distribution. As sug-
gested above,52 the corporation presumably is protected if it relies in
good faith on the buyer's representation, even though the representa-
tion later appears to have been false. It is a reasonable guess that other
beneficial owner problems (partnerships, trusts, husband and wife)
will be treated as under the 35-Man Exemption.
As with the 35-Man Exemption, several sales to the same buyer
41 Section 5.1, second paragraph.
46 See note 35 supra.
" Section 5.H.
41 Section S.E.
"' Sections 5.F and G.
so Section 6.
51 Section 7.
52 See text, 1.2 supra.
53 Ibid.
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are counted only once, and there is no distinction between sales inside
or outside of Texas.' In contrast to the 3 5-Man Exemption, it is the
number of purchasers (rather than the number of security holders
at the conclusion of the offering) that is decisive. If a corporation
sells to fifteen purchasers, five of whom resell to the remaining ten,
the corporation can make no additional sales.
3.6 Sophistication Of Purchasers
The exemption for sales to banks, insurance companies, and other
financial institutions"5 rather obviously rests on the sophistication of
the purchasers. The 15-a-Year Exemption has no express requirement
that the purchasers be sophisticated, and it would have been hard to
fashion one.ss The roughly comparable federal exemption for private
offerings57 has no express requirement of sophistication, but some-
thing of the sort has been inferred judicially and administratively."
The draftsmen of the Texas provision were fully aware of this as
they wrote. One can fairly conclude that a part of the sophistication
element has been quietly absorbed by the Texas provision from the
federal one. This conclusion is suggested by the statutory require-
ment that the notice to the Commissioner identify the purchasers;"s
such information hardly would be necessary if only their number
were material. The Commissioner's form of notice"0 goes further and
calls for information on each purchaser's occupation and relation to
the issuer. Quite properly, he will take these factors into considera-
tion in deciding whether to exercise his unusually broad powers to
suspend the exemption. He may do so if he has reasonable cause to
believe that the transaction would tend to work a fraud upon the
purchaser."5 His large grant of discretion carries with it the authority
to examine all relevant factors, whether or not specified by the act,
in relation to each purchaser. Therefore, counsel would be well ad-
54 If all the sales were made outside Texas, the Texas Act presumably would be inapplic-
able and the exemption unnecessary. Whether a Texas corporation, or one doing its principal
business in the state, can completely shift the sale beyond the jurisdiction of the Act is an
open question.
" Section 5.H.
5 See text, 5.1 (b) infra.
5 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(i) (1958).
" From the legislative history, the United States Supreme Court concluded that an offer-
ing "to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves" was exempt. SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). For further discussion, see 1 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 663-65. On administrative interpretation see, e.g., Orrick, Some Observations
on the Administration of the Securities Laws, 42 Minn. L. Rev. 25, 33-34 (1957); Victor &
Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 Va. L. Rev. 869, 871-72 (1959).
'9 Section 5.1, second paragraph, first sentence.
60 See note 35 supra.
61 See text, 4.7 infra.
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vised to discourage the use of this exemption for sales to "widow and
orphan" types.
4. SOME OVERLAPPING QUESTIONS
4.1 Manner Of Offering
All three of the Texas small offering exemptions are conditioned
on the absence of "any public solicitation or advertisements."'" These
terms are not defined" and have not been construed fully. They
obviously preclude mass media advertising and large-scale mail or
telephone solicitation.
The federal private offering exemption imposes its nonnumerical
limits on the offerees, even though the actual purchasers may be far
fewer." The Texas numerical limits (thirty-five and fifteen) apply
only to purchasers, but the prohibition on public solicitation imposes
nonnumerical limits on the offerees, with a result similar to the federal
nonnumerical limits."' In the Commissioner's view, serious questions
arise if an offering under any of the three exemptions extends beyond
the issuer's (and its principals') business associates, friends, family,
and the like.
4.2 Convertibles And Warrants
The Employee Option Exemption is limited to stock, which may
be either preferred or common, although the former almost never is
used. The other two small offering exemptions are good for any kind
of securities, including convertibles and warrants. In contrast to
6 Section 5.1, first clause.
63 "Offer for sale" is defined to include every attempt to dispose of a security for value.
5 4.E. Plainly, not every offer will be an advertisement or public solicitation. By § 22, it
is unlawful "to issue, distribute, or publish . . . any circular, advertisement, pamphlet,
prospectus, program or other matter, as to any security, unless such advertising" complies
with certain requirements. (Emphasis added.) This is not a formal or general definition;
even if it is, it defines "advertising" (rather than "advertisement," the word used in § 5.1
and only one of the elements in the § 22 listing). Moreover, it turns as much on the method
of dissemination ("issue, distribute or publish") as on the thing disseminated. (To the
same effect is the criminal provision on advertising, § 29.H.) All in all, it sheds little
light on the meaning of "advertisement" in § 5.1.
64 The exemption is cast in terms of the "offering"; see the language quoted in note 36
supra. "You will note that this [the number of offerees] does not mean the number of actual
purchasers, but the number of persons to whom the security . . . is offered. . . . Any
attempt to dispose of a security should be regarded as an offer. [P]reliminary negotia-
tions or conversations with a substantial number of prospective purchasers would .. .cause
the offering . . . to be a public offering .... " SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No.
285, Jan. 24, 1935, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 55 2740-44, at 2674.
6 Logically, the number of permissible offerees under Texas law must be somewhat
greater than the respective numerical limits (35 and 15) on purchasers or holders. It is
common knowledge that not everyone who is approached will buy, and the legislature
hardly could have intended to apply silently to offerees the numbers it sets out explicitly
for buyers.
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federal law," the sale of a convertible or warrant does not constitute
an offer or sale of the underlying security in Texas. 7 The actual con-
version, or the exercise of a nontransferable warrant (each of which
involves a sale of the underlying security) is separately exempt." The
exercise of a transferable warrant is not per se exempt, but it may
qualify under the 3 5-Man or 15-a-Year Exemptions if the appropriate
requirements are met.
4.3 Role Of The Broker-Dealer
The small offering exemptions contain no prohibition on payment
of commissions or on the use of broker-dealers to assist in the offering.
Nevertheless, the ban on public solicitation and advertising will com-
pel the broker-dealer to act very discreetly."
Selling to a broker-dealer for his own account is separately ex-
empt," but it presents difficulties because of the widespread feeling
that persons in the business of selling securities do not take them "for
investment."71 Resales by a broker-dealer would be especially likely
to destroy either the 35-Man or 15-a-Year Exemptions. Accordingly,
extra precautions (like transfer restrictions) may be advisable, par-
ticularly since the Commissioner feels that the question of public
solicitation arises whenever a broker-dealer is used.
4.4 Interrelation Of Exemptions
Although the three small offering exemptions are separate, a close
reading of the statute reveals a number of interrelations and certain
planning possibilities.
(A) Option sales to employees must be counted toward the limit
in the 35-Man Exemption, but may continue on their own under the
Employee Option Exemption. As a result, option sales should be
postponed (insofar as possible) until all contemplated sales to non-
employees have been completed. Indeed, against the possibility that
66 Generally speaking, a warrant or convertible is an offer of the underlying security at
all times when it is exercisable or convertible. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(3), 48 Stat.
74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1958); 1 Loss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 299-300.
67 Section 4.E, sixth sentence.
66 Section 5E. It is a condition of the exemption that no remuneration (other than a
stand-by commission) be paid for soliciting the conversion or exercise.
"5For the comparable proposition under federal law, see SEC Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 2770-83, at 2682-83. In
general, see Stuebner, The Role of the Investment Banker in Arranging Private Financing,
16 Bus. Law. 377 (1961).
" Section 5.H.
""[P]urchases by persons engaged in the business of buying and selling securities re-
quire careful scrutiny for the purpose of determining whether such person may be acting
as an underwriter for the issuer"; i.e., rather than taking for investment. SEC Securities
Act of 1933 Release No. 4552, Nov. 6, 1962, i CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 55 2770-83, at
2683. To the same effect, under the intrastate exemption, see SEC Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 55 2270-77, at 2583.
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
an optionee is a security holder for purpose of the thirty-five,2 it
may be wise not even to grant employee options until all contemp-
lated sales to nonemployees have been completed.
(B) The relation of the 35-Man and 15-a-Year Exemptions already
has been noted: 3 i.e., sales under the 35-Man Exemption in any given
twelve months must be counted toward the 15-a-Year Exemption
for the same twelve months. There is little room for planning in this
situation. However, there may be rare instances of a happy combina-
tion of exemptions: e.g., the 35-Man Exemption provides initial
capitalization; institutional financing 4 and sales to existing security
holders' carry for the next twelve months; and a private placement
with new individuals follows under the 15-a-Year Exemption.
(C) The relation of the Employee Option and the 1S-a-Year Ex-
emption was mentioned in 3.5 supra: i.e., option sales must be
counted toward the 15-a-Year Exemption. The effect is to reduce
the usefulness of the latter exemption for companies with extensive
option plans (unless the plans are registered). Some control over this
result may be accomplished by postponing the exercisability of options
during periods in which exempt private placement is anticipated.
4.5 Relation To Other Exemptions
The 35-Man and 15-a-Year Exemptions can be followed by other
exemptions, such as for sales to financial institutions" or to existing
security holders," or for reorganizations8 and acquisitions." If the
order is reversed, the 15-a-Year Exemption is unaffected but the 3 5-
Man Exemption is impaired; the degree of impairment will depend,
of course, on the number of security holders involved in the other
transactions. The Employee Option Exemption can be used indepen-
dently of and in addition to exemptions in other sections, either
before or after.
4.6 Relation To Federal Exemptions
Without a corresponding federal exemption, a local exemption is
not worth much, for there still will be the delay and expense of
registration with the SEC. Many purely local offerings by local com-
72 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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panies will be federally exempt as intrastate offerings,"0 although this
exemption has far more limitations and pitfalls than is generally
realized. " Another possibility is resort to Regulation A 2 which, how-
ever, is limited to issues of 300,000 dollars or less and which requires
substantial filings with the SEC. The remaining (and most impor-
tant) federal exemption is for private offerings. "3 Without attempting
a detailed analysis, most 35-Man and 15-a-Year Exemptions will
qualify federally as private offerings, although more "sophistica-
tion" 4 and "investment intent"'" are probably necessary for the federal
than for the 35-Man. Also, thirty-five at one time would dangerously
stretch the rule of thumb of twenty-five which has grown up around
the federal exemption"s (and which is none too reliable there). The
Employee Option Exemption has no analogue in federal law, and
offerings of this sort must be registered with the SEC (or qualified
under Regulation A) unless they are sufficiently limited geographi-
cally to be intrastate or numerically to be private.
4.7 Revocation Of Exemptions
Only one of the small offering exemptions has (like the secondary
trading exemption") a built-in power of revocation by the Com-
missioner. This is the 15-a-Year Exemption. " The Commissioner may
revoke or suspend the exemption if he has reasonable cause to believe
that the plan of business or the sale of the security would tend to
work a fraud. No notice or opportunity -for hearing is required,
but his order is not effective until the issuer has received actual notice.
The issuer may request a hearing before the Commissioner. After
the hearing, the Commissioner must issue a written decision stating
his reasons;8 ' it is subject to judicial review.0
Quite apart from this summary power to revoke or to suspend,
80 An intrastate offering is "any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold
only to persons resident within a single State . . . where the issuer . . . is . . . incorporated
by and doing business within such State .... . Securities Act of 1933, S 3 (a) (11), 48
Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1I) (1958).
8" In Texas, the federal intrastate exemption can be used only by a concern incorporated
in Texas and performing substantial operations in the state. A single reoffer out of state,
even though not by the issuer and not resulting in a sale, may destroy the entire exemption.
SEC Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 4434, Dec. 6, 1961, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
55 2270-77.
S2SEC Rules 251-63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-230.263 (1964), pursuant to Securities Act
of 1933, S 3(b), 48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958).
83Quoted in note 36 supra.
84 See text, 3.6 supra.
85 See text, 3.2 supra.
" I Loss, Securities Regulation 660-65 (2d ed. 1961).
87 Section 5.0.





the Commissioner has general authority, after notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing, to prohibit the sale of any security. Here he
operates with somewhat broader criteria; he may prohibit the sale if
he finds that it would tend to work a fraud or would not be "fair,
just and equitable."'"
In addition to being swifter, the summary power to suspend has a
lower threshold than the general power to prohibit: to suspend the
Commissioner need only have "reasonable cause to believe"; for the
general power he must "determine." These differences indicate that
the legislature was particularly concerned over possible abuses of
the 15-a-Year Exemption and armed the Commissioner accordingly.
4.8 Failure To Comply With An Exemption
Each of the three small offering exemptions has enough technicali-
ties or uncertainties to make violation a real possibility. The conse-
quences may include: (A) rescission or damage recoveries by pur-
chasers;"' (B) insistence that the issuer show in its financial state-
ments a contingent liability for such rescission or damages;9" (C)
injunction or stop order against further sales;94 (D) criminal con-
viction; 9' or (E) if a securities dealer is involved, revocation of his
license.9 The issuer has the burden of proving exemption if it is
questioned. '
Many practical factors enter into a realistic appraisal of the risks.
Buyers are unlikely to sue if their securities are worth more than
they paid for them. 9 Criminal and administrative proceedings are
improbable except in willful cases. Violations often go undiscovered.99
Purchasers may not know of the technical requirements or suspect
that there has been noncompliance. State officials have little occasion
D' Section 23.A.....
92 Section 33.
" This sanction, without explicit statutory authority, is imposed in connection with the
required contents of financial statements in a registration. § 7.A(1)f. For federal practice,
see Israels, When Corporations Go Public 147-49 (1962).




9 This is particularly true of employees who have bought on options. They probably
will not have exercised the options unless the option price is below the going market for
the security. Moreover, the pressures of employment (so long as they continue) will deter
litigation.
" In a rescission action for failure to register, limitations are three years from the con-
tract of sale. For material misrepresentations or omissions, they are three years from the
time the buyer "in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered that [the] sale
was made in violation." § 33.C. Assuming that the only violation was failure to register,
the buyer has three years in which to sue; this is much more generous than the one year
available under federal law. Securities Act of 1933, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77m (1958). Criminal prosecutions must be brought within three years. Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 180 (1954) (nonenumerated felonies).
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to investigate sales unless complaints are made or unless a registration
statement is filed later for a public offering.
Thus, the odds are against serious repercussions for violations where
the law is not interpreted (e.g., certain counting problems) or from
actions over which the issuer has little control (e.g., resales or reoffers
despite investment representations). This is especially true if the
issuer has made a good faith attempt to comply.1" But there is no ex-
cuse for trifling with the exemptions, which represent limited excep-
tions to registration laws embodying a vital policy of investor pro-
tection.
The Commissioner takes the position that the act makes no dis-
tinction between willful and nonwillful violation. In furtherance of
his policy of preventing violations, he and his staff encourage inquiries
and pre-filing conferences." 1
4.9 Extent Of Exemption
It should be emphasized that the exemption is from the registration
and prospectus requirements.' By a literal reading, the exemption
extends (illogically) to the criminal provisions. But there is no
exemption from the stop order or injunction sections, or (more im-
portant) from civil liability for material omissions or for misstate-
ments in the sale of securities.'" And, of course, there is nothing in
the Texas Act which assures exemption from federal law."1
10 An opinion of counsel often is sought, both for its analytical value and as evidence
of good faith. Since the availability of an exemption often depends heavily on facts, some
of which are unknown or have not yet occurred, counsel may have difficulty giving a firm
opinion. He faces the dilemma of investigating the facts to his satisfaction (which he may
not be equipped to do) or so qualifying his opinion by assumed facts that it is more
hypothetical than real.
101 Many lawyers are hesitant to ask the Commissioner about borderline cases. They
fear that government officials incline toward assertion of jurisdiction and are likely to re-
quire registration or to impose regulation that might be avoided by a calculated risk. Un-
doubtedly, there is basis for such apprehension. On the other hand, an informal inquiry
may give both assistance and reassurance in many instances. Note, however, that a favorable
opinion by the Commissioner or his staff is of little or no help in a civil liability (rescission)
action by a purchaser claiming that there was no exemption.
"'By § 5, first paragraph, the exemption lets the issuer avoid being a dealer, which
otherwise it probably would be under the broad definition of § 4.C. Thus, it is relieved
from the necessity of registering as a dealer under § 12.
10 The opening language of the sections on exempt transactions and exempt securities
(55 5, 6) states that "the provisions of this Act shall not apply" to the enumerated items
"except as hereinafter in this Act specifically provided." In cognizance of this, S 23.A
(stop orders), 532 (injunction), and § 33 (civil liability) in varying phraseology specifically
provide that they operate regardless of exemptions. (Before the 1963 amendment, civil
liability was cut off by exemptions; see Committee on Securities and Investment Banking
of the Section on Corp., Bank. and Bus. Law of the State Bar of Texas, Comment- 1963
Amendment [to Sec. 33], 1B Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. 69-70 (1964).) But there is no
such specific provision in § 29 (penal provisions) or § 22 (advertising). On the latter
point, recall that some exemptions have their own prohibitions on advertising. See text,
4.1 supra.
1o See note 94 supra.
1o1 See text, 4.6 supra.
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4.10 Cautions On The Federal Analogy
Anyone looking at the Texas small offering exemptions is tempted
to interpret them in the light of the federal private offering exemp-
tion, and this Article often has yielded to the temptation. It is a
natural thing to do because of the much greater experience with and
jurisprudence on the federal exemption. But a critical difference must
be taken into account if the tendency is to be kept within rational
bounds. The difference is the obvious one that the principal Texas
exemptions are numerical (fifteen and thirty-five) and objective but
the federal exemption is not.
Specificity in the small offering exemptions has been an over-
whelming wish of blue sky lawyers in generaP. and of the members
of the State Bar Committee who drafted section 5.1 in the form
passed by legislature. In recognition of this deliberate choice of
specificity in the face of the federal precedent, it is proper to draw
on the federal analogy only to the extent that is consistent with
the objective, numerical character of the state provision. There is
no reason to import all the nebulous features which complicate and
confuse the federal exemption.
5. THE RATIONALE FOR SMALL OFFERINGS EXEMPTIONS
Although exemptions permeate the securities laws, there has been
little attempt to examine why they are there or whether they should
be.' The small offering exemptions discussed in this Article should
be among the easiest to explore in this respect. Yet, even here, diver-
gent factors can be cited and widely different emphases placed upon
them. No clear theoretical pattern emerges. And in most states (in-
cluding Texas) there is no real legislative history to guide us. "'
1'Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 373 (1958).
107 Among the attempts are: Bromberg, Book Review, 12 J. Legal Ed. 127, 130 (1959);
Hill, Some Comments on the Uniform Securities Act, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 661, 690-94
(1961); Raines, Exemptions Under the Texas Securities Act: A Critique 22-24 (1962-63,
unpublished Seminar Paper in Securities Regulation, SMU Law School Library). Probably
the most comprehensive, drawing on many sources, is Note, The Uniform Securities Act,
12 Stan. L. Rev. 103 (1959); Id. at 146-51 (small offerings).
A sharp argument against the federal private offering exemption, on grounds of its anti-
competitive effects, is Steffen, The Private Placement Exemption: What to Do about a
Fortuitous Combination in Restraint of Trade, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 211 (1963).
10 The legislative history of the federal private offering exemption is meagre and general;
the private offering was said to be a transaction "where there is no practical need for
[the bill's] application or where the public benefits are too remote." H.R. Rep. No. 85,
73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). The implications are examined and formulated in the
leading case of SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953): "[T]he applicability
of [the exemption] should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected needs
the protection of the Act. An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for
themselves is a transaction 'not involving any public offering' "; hence it is exempt.
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Like many arguments about government activity,10 this one can
be discussed conveniently in terms of benefit and burden. We first
discuss them separately, and then weighed against each other.
5.1 Benefit
We assume that securities registration brings diverse benefits,
such as preventing fraud,11 disclosing relevant information, and (in
states like Texas) setting some minimum qualitative standards for
salable securities."5 ' It follows that an exemption is justified if regis-
tration would produce little or no benefit. This leads us to consider
who is benefited by registration, and to what extent.
a. Quantitative Considerations Let us make the fairly reasonable
additional assumption that the benefits of registration are propor-
tional either to the dollar volume of securities or to the number of
buyers. To justify the small offering exemptions, it would suffice to
show that registration would not provide significant benefit to the
various groups we might select for consideration.
(1) If it is the community and the economy at large which bene-
fit from registration (say, through better capital instruments or more
'o' Compare Blum & Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation 35-39, 100-03
(1953).
"0 A statistically oriented economist has questioned the whole policy of registration with
data which "suggest that the S.E.C. registration requirements had no important effect on
the quality of new securities sold to the public." Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities
Markets, 37 J. Bus. U. Chi. 117, 120-24 (1964). He has compared market performances
of registered and nonregistered public issues. The market performances compared were,
respectively, before (1923-28) and after (1949-55) the SEC went into operation. A com-
parison of contemporaneous registered and nonregistered public issues obviously is impossible
since virtually all public issues have been registered since 1933. Nevertheless, his use of
such different time periods weakens his argument. In addition, he makes the questionable
assumption that the proper test of public policy here is whether investors have made money.
Some states are oriented this way, but the federal policy has been not so much to help
investors make money (or to keep them from losing it) as to have a more informed basis
for their investment judgments. Thus, Stigler ignores the possibility that, post-SEC, the
losses may have been incurred by people who are better equipped, financially or psycholog-
ically, to bear them as a result of the SEC process. Nevertheless, Stigler's is a refreshing
approach to testing public policy. Stigler's theories, data, and conclusions have been scrutin-
ized and rejected by Friend & Herman, The SEC through a Glass Darkly, - J. Bus. U.
Chi. - (Oct. 1964).
i" The costs of preventing securities fraud are certainly lower than the losses and the
civil and criminal enforcement costs occasioned by fraud.
112 In general, see Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 67-79 (1958); Uniform Securities Act
306(a) (2) (E) & (F) (registration may be denied if the offering would tend to work
a fraud or would involve unreasonable compensation to promoters or underwriters). In Tex-
as, see § 9.B (commissions and marketing expenses limited to 207), § 19.A (permit granted
if plan of business and consideration paid by promoters are fair, just and equitable); State
Securities Board, Administrative Interpretation of Section 7C(2) and Section 10A of the
Securities Act of Texas (undated, issued about June, 1961) (price paid by promoter
ordinarily must be at least 4/5 the price paid by the public; ordinarily, not more than
90% of capital may be sought from the public); State Securities Board, Statement of
Policy Regarding Options and Warrants (undated, issued early 1960, amended Oct. 29,
1962), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. 5 46612 (general limits on options to employees; specifiic limits
on and terms of options to underwriters).
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efficient allocation of funds), we must look to the aggregate effect of
small offerings. It is difficult to gauge their volume. We can start
with figures published by the SEC which show that more corporate
securities are now placed privately than publicly.1 ' However, the
great majority of these securities are bonds or notes of relatively
established concerns that are sold to insurance companies and other
institutional investors." These buyers presumably are quite able to
fend for themselves, and neither they nor the economy would derive
much benefit from registration. An exemption for such sales is thus
easy to justify in qualitative terms."'
But the SEC's figures omit private offerings under 100,000 dollars,"4
which are precisely the ones that must be justified separately if the
present form of the small offering exemptions is to withstand criti-
cism. These offerings are made mainly by less-established issuers to
individuals, and probably tend more heavily to stock than to debt.
No doubt, the SEC's failure to tabulate them is due to the difficulty
of obtaining information about them; they are unlikely to be regis-
tered in the states or announced in the financial press, and, because
they are private, they are not registered with the SEC.
Other data suggest that these nontabulated or "small-small" offer-
ings are of the order of 400-500 million dollars and 500,000-600,000
buyers a year in the nation,"' including 20 million dollars and 25,000
13 6.4 billion dollars privately and 5.8 billion dollars publicly in 1963 (total 12.2
billion dollars). SEC Statistical Series Release No. 1953, Jan. 28, 1964.
114 In 1963, 89% of all corporate offerings were bonds and notes (10.9 billion out of
12.2 billion dollars); in 1961 it was 72% (9.4 billion out of 12.1 billion dollars). SEC
Statistical Series Release No. 1953, Jan. 28, 1964. The debt proportion in private placements
was probably still higher, although figures are not available for these years. For 1951, 1953,
and 1955, debt represented 96% of private placements (9.2 billion out of 9.5 billion
dollars), but only 75% of all corporate offerings (20.2 billion out of 26.9 billion dollars).
SEC Cost of Flotation of Corporate Securities 1951-1955, at 62-63 (1957); 22 SEC Ann.
Rep. 234 (1956). In years for which reported private placements have been classified by
types of purchasers, life insurance companies have bought nearly 90% and other financial
institutions most of the rest. SEC, Privately-Placed Securities--Cost of Flotation 6 (1952).
Life insurance companies almost everywhere must limit their investments in corporations to
those of substantial size, age, or demonstrated earning capacity.
115 Exemptions for sales to financial institutions are widespread. Loss & Cowett, Blue
Sky Law 367 (1958); Uniform Securities Act § 402 (b) (8); Texas § 5.H. There is no
such provision in the federal law.
But see, on the anticompetitive effects of the federal private offering exemption, Steffen,
supra note 107.
... 28 SEC Ann. Rep. 178 (1962). This same limitation carries over to other figures
based on the SEC data, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United
States Colonial Times to 1957, 652, 658 (1960); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Ab-
stract of the United States 624 (1963).
... Volume of Small-Small Offerings. New business corporations are formed at the rate
of 16,000 a month (seasonally adjusted) or 185,622 for 1963. Wall Street Journal, June 10,
1964, p. 1, col. 4 (Southwest ed.); Survey of Current Business, Feb., 1964, p. S-7. To find
those not tabulated by the SEC, we eliminate by two adjustments those which the SEC
does tabulate. First, we subtract 2,000 (the total number of registrations). Second, we
eliminate those who made private offerings over $100,000 (which are tabulated by the
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buyers in Texas.' s If these estimates are at all accurate, it is hard
to say that the community and the economy would not benefit by
having them registered. The figures are large in themselves, and they
SEC). No direct figures are available for current years. The last available appear to be
2,613 private offerings totalling 10.1 billion dollars for 1951, 1953, and 1955 combined.
SEC, Cost of Flotation of Corporate Securities 1951-1955, at 25 (1957). The average size
then was 4 million dollars. Assuming no change in the average size, about 1,600 issuers
would have accounted for the 6.4 billion dollars of private offerings tabulated by the SEC
for 1963. See note 113 supra. (This is corroborated by an industry publication's figures
showing 1,388 private placements totalling 7.3 billion dollars in 1963. Investment Dealers'
Digest, Corporate Financing Directory, § II, p. 94 (Feb. 3, 1964). The exact coverage is
not stated, but they seem to be large issues sold through brokers or to institutions. Id. at
82-91, 94-96.)
The two groups of SEC-tabulated offerings total 3,600 in number. Undoubtedly most of
these are established companies, not new ones. Yet even if they were all new, their elimina-
tion leaves over 180,000 new corporations which somehow were financed in 1963, presum-
ably by private offerings under $100,000.
We assume an average of $2,000 capitalization for each of these corporations. This is a
modest figure for many enterprises, and is only twice the legal minimum in some twenty
states. See 2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated 183-85 (1960). 180,000 corpora-
tions at $2,000 each would indicate 360 million dollars of nontabulated financing by new
companies. In addition, a quite substantial amount must be done by companies formed in
previous years. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that offerings not tabulated by the SEC
are of the order of 400 to 500 million dollars a year. These are the "small-small" offerings
necessary to an appraisal of the state small offering exemptions.
If new corporations had an average of three investors each (probably a low guess),
540,000 sales would have occurred. The number of buyers may have been smaller, because
some invested in several companies. But others might have taken small offerings in older
companies. Altogether, it seems reasonable to suppose that the number of buyers in "small-
small" offerings is in the range of 500,000 to 600,000 a year.
Our figures for small-small offerings thus represent 4% by dollar amount and 98%
by number of securities offerings.
The proportion of buyers represented is harder to determine but probably is rather high.
A revealing comparison is with the dynamic broad-based, highly regulated mutual fund in-
dustry. Its accounts (shareholders) increased by a net of 241,480 in 1963. Investment Com-
pany Institute, Mutual Funds-A Statistical Summary, 1940-1963, at 1. The gross number
of buyers must have been somewhat higher, since an unspecified number of accounts were
closed by complete redemption. Even assuming .6 redeemer for each buyer (this is the
dollar ratio of redemptions to sales, Id. at 2, ignoring partial redemptions which probably
predominated), we would have net buyers equalling .4 (i.e., 1 - .6) of gross. This generous
estimate gives 603,700 mutual fund buyers, the same size as the group we have found buying
in small-small offerings.
s 9,444 firms were incorporated in Texas in the fiscal year ended August 31, 1962.
Martin, Common Problems of Corporation Lawyers in Texas 3 (Speech to State Bar of
Texas, Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law, July 5, 1963). During the same
period, the Commissioner received only 911 applications for registration, covering 412
million dollars, of which he granted 695 for 357 million dollars. Of the granted permits,
only 128 for 108 million dollars were for Texas issuers; not all of these were corporations
and probably relatively few of them were new corporations. Thus, at most 1.5% of the
newly chartered Texas corporations received permits, probably less than 1%.
Assuming, as in note 117 supra, $2,000 and 3 investors per new corporation, some 18
million dollars were obtained from nearly 28,000 investors by new corporations under the
small offering exemptions. This is in addition to amounts (perhaps much larger) similarly
obtained by older corporations. Not all of this amount may have been raised in Texas, but
the non-Texas portion was probably more than offset by funds raised in Texas by non-
Texas corporations (which have not been included in this estimate).
Inclusion of offerings by older corporations probably brings the totals over 20 million
dollars. Texas small offerings, therefore, represent some 6% by volume and 92% by number
of total offerings (ignoring offerings under other exemptions, for which no figures are avail-
able).
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represent some four per cent by volume and well over ninety per cent
by number of corporate offerings, and an unknown (but probably
rather high) proportion of buyers.11
(2) If the benefit of registration is thought to go to purchasers in
the aggregate (say, through protection from fraud or through in-
formation for more intelligent investment choices), the reasoning and
results would be the same as in (1) above.
(3) If the benefit is thought to go to purchasers individually, then
because each purchase is relatively small in dollar amount, it becomes
reasonable to apply a de minimis theory and to say that there would
be no significant benefit in registering any particular "small-small"
offering. It also becomes more convincing to argue that protection
is afforded by factors other than registration, such as the buyer's
proximity to and familiarity with the issuer. This may be true, but
it is hardly a complete justification for existing numerical exemptions
which are not limited to such situations. Nevertheless, the argument of
proximity and familiarity does go a long way to justify the Employee
Option Exemption, especially if taken in conjunction with the tax
benefits and price advantages supplied by the options and with the
potential improvement of the employment relation.
Pointing the other way is the traditional view that new and small
ventures carry higher investment risks. One can argue from this view
that the benefits of registration would be greatest in this area, and
that exemption would be justified least.'
None of these approaches offers any ready dividing line between
what should be exempt and what should not-whether the exemp-
tions are measured in dollars, number of purchasers, type of issuer,
or otherwise. Even if the line is drawn arbitrarily, it is only a con-
vention to say that one side of the line is private and the other is
public.
b. Qualitative Considerations Another approach looks to see whether
the purchasers are the kind of persons (rather than the number) who
would benefit from registration. This view leads to the already
119 See note 117 supra, last two paragraphs.
0 Although nearly half of the states have no exemption for small offerings, Loss &
Cowett, Blue Sky Law 369 (1958), apparently only California seriously requires registra-
tion. Some 80% of the permits issued there are for "close" corporations, often with escrow
requirements to prevent later distribution of stock; see Smith, The California Corporate
Securities Law and the "Close" Corporation, 32 L. A. Bar. Bull. 227 (1957). The California
treatment of small offerings is discussed further in Jennings, The Role of the States in Cor-
porate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 193, 217-18 (1958).
The futile attempt to relax it and the effective way to circumvent it are described in Jen-
nings & Marsh, Securities Regulation Cases and Materials 501-02 (1963).
In other states without a small offering exemption, the administrator is likely to say,
"the act is not intended for this kind of case," and to look the other way. Loss & Cowett,
Blue Sky Law 82 (1958).
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familiar idea that exemption is proper for sophisticated, informed
investors-i.e., those able to fend for themselves. But this idea cannot
be equated with a purely numerical exemption because numbers
alone are no guarantee of either sophistication or information. Infor-
mation requirements can be built into an exemption to some degree,
as they have been in the Texas 15-a-Year provision. 2' But sophistica-
tion is hardly measurable as a quality or enforceable as a requirement.
In many small-small offerings, there is a real identity of interests
between the issuer and the investors, e.g., when proprietors or
partners incorporate. Viewing a very close corporation as the "alter
ego" of its shareholders is an imprecise and largely discredited way
of imposing individual liability on shareholders in corporation law,
but it makes sense in the context of small offering exemptions.
Who benefits if a man registers shares which in effect he is selling
to himself?. 2 Once again, the difficulty is not in the theory but in
its lack of correlation with any of the existing formulations of the
small offering exemption. Sales can be made to complete strangers
under the present exemptions, and undoubtedly they are, although
we do not know how extensively. But it would not be easy to devise
a test that sharply distinguishes investors from participants.
Since much of the disclosure in registration concerns past operating
and financial history of the issuer, it might appear that registration
offers little protection to investors when the issuer is so new that it
has no history. The argument overlooks the many relevant aspects
of a new company that registration normally would reveal (and that
private negotiation often would not), particularly those relating to
promotion of the company and to management's experience, security
holdings, remuneration, and transactions with the company. Other
important ones would include industry conditions (e.g., competitive
factors) and relatively detailed plans for the use of the proceeds of
the offering and for operation of the business."'a
121 See text, 3.4 supra.
12 For a judicial statement of this view, see Durham v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
47 Ariz. 280, 55 P.2d 648, 651 (1936) discussing the reason for the creation of Arizona's
exemption for "close" corporations.
'2" Of the rag bag of information required by statute in a Texas registration, 5 7.A (1),
very little is of this sort. See, contra, subparagraph (d) (promotional compensation). Rather,
such data is elicited by the State Securities Board's Suggested Outline to Assist in Preparing
Prospectus for Local Texas Offerings Only (undated, issued about 1962), issued pursuant
to the authority in § 9.C to require prospectuses. The Suggested Outline is much more
pointed than the Act and closely follows SEC Form S-1, 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 7121-29,
which is the basic form for registration under the federal law.
For a classic analysis of inadequate disclosure concerning a new business, see Texas Glass
Mfg. Corp., 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
1964]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
5.2 Burden
The burdens of securities registration include (A) delay; (B) legal,
accounting, and other professional fees; (C) printing costs; and (D)
possible modification in the terms of the offering to satisfy the ad-
ministrator. For smaller businesses and offerings, these burdens are
likely to be proportionately greater."' They are felt also in a lower
rate of return for investors (whether the additional costs are passed
on to them or absorbed in the enterprise's own expense). These bur-
dens make it harder for small business to attract capital, a job which
already is difficult because of high risks and vulnerabilities.' s
Since small business is extolled as a prime virtue of the United
States economy and democracy,' it is not hard to see why a legis-
lature would be prone to relieve it from the burdens of securities
registration. But an exemption does much more than grant this relief
'2' Delay. Delay might be no greater on small offerings than on large, although smaller
companies often have business and accounting practices which call for greater scrutiny of
their financial statements and other documents. In the aggregate, registration of small offer-
ings would greatly tax the administrators and slow down all offerings, except in the unlikely
event of a proportionate increase in agency staff.
Costs. Some of the costs of tabulated registrations are more properly attributable to the
public distribution of the securities than to registration per se. Obvious examples are printing
of prospectuses and engraving of stock certificates or bonds. But many substantial expenses
are precipitated by registration itself. See SEC, Cost of Flotation of Corporate Securities
1951-1955, at 6-8, 25-34 (1957), and compare Table 15 at 54-55 with Table 25 at 68-69;
Tables 16-17 at 56-59 with Table 28 at 72-73. See also I Loss, op. cit. supra note 86, at
370-73. On costs of underwriting small issues, see Flink, Equity Financing of Small
Manufacturing Companies in New Jersey 76-84 (1962).
An investigator who concluded that state securities regulation "does not seriously im-
pede the financing of small business" was looking at a pattern which widely exempted small
offerings. And he found that federal registration had impeded in many instances, even with
the private offering exemption. Margraf, Does Securities Regulation Hinder Financing Small
Business?, 11 Law & Contemp. Prob. 301, 319 (1945).
Modification. Modification by the administrator is far more likely to be urged on a small
company. The administrator may think the price is too high because there is little or no
earnings history or book value. The promoter's share, though small in absolute value, may
look large in relation to that of other investors. The untried business may call for more
protective provisions for investors, or (in the eyes of some administrators) militate against
the use of senior securities. Other devices (like escrow of promoters' securities or limitation
on options, executive compensation, or selling expense) may be required for their own sake
or as a way of exerting pressure to achieve other concessions. Often the small issuer is so
weak or short of funds that it will yield to the administrator rather than negotiate. On the
conditions which may be imposed in registration, see Loss & Cowett, Blue Sky Law 67-79
(1958); California Corporation Manual §§ 258-64 (1961); see also the Texas references
in note 112 supra.
12 See, e.g., Mayer & Goldstein, The First Two Years: Problems of Small Firm Growth
and Survival 117-33 (Small Business Research Series No. 2, 1961); Cahn, Capital for Small
Business: Sources and Methods, 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 27, 66-67 (1959).
' "It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid .
small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise . . . and to maintain
and strengthen the over-all economy of the Nation." Small Business Act of 1953, 67 Stat.
232, as amended, 15 U.S.C. S 631 (Supp. V, 1964).
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if it bears no relation to the size of the issuer or of the offering.'
Such is the case with the Texas 35-Man and 15-a-Year Exemptions
(although there will not be many large businesses with fewer than
thirty-five security holders).
The burden argument also can be made in terms of the cost to
government of its regulatory action."2' If the cost is greatly dis-
proportionate to the benefits afforded, then it is reasonable to dis-
connect the government by an exemption.
Another burden of registration, about which one can be less
sympathetic, is the liability incurred by the unwitting violator. Such
violations are much more likely to occur among small issuers who
simply are not cognizant of the securities laws and who obtain little
or no legal advice. Small offering exemptions were designed in large
measure for such people, and they undoubtedly would suffer if the
exemptions were eliminated. However, we cannot sympathize too
much with the businessman who violates the law, even if uninten-
127 Legislation directed more specifically at small business has come up with a number of
different tests:
(A) For income tax purposes, ordinary rather than capital loss deductions are permitted
for certain securities originally offered in amounts up to $500,000 by corporations with
equity capital under $1,000,000. In addition, more than half the corporation's income
must be from active rather than passive sources. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 5 1244.
(B) Another type of corporation may elect to have its income taxed to the shareholders
rather than to the corporation if it has no more than 10 shareholders, at least 80% of its
income is from active rather than passive sources, and certain other conditions are met.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 55 1371-77.
(C) For loans from the Small Business Administration and assistance in government
procurement and subcontracting, small business is defined in various industries by number
of employees (usually 500 to 1,000) or annual sales or revenues (usually I to 2 million
dollars). 13 C.F.R. §5 121.3-8, 121.3-10, 121.3-12 (1963). In addition, the concern must
be "independently owned and operated and . . . not dominant in its field of operation."
72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. 5 632 (1958).
(D) To be eligible for investment by an SBA-licensed Small Business Investment Com-
pany, a concern must not exceed 5 million dollars in assets, 2.5 million dollars in net worth,
and $250,000 in taxable income, as well as certain levels of employment and sales. 13
C.F.R. § 121.3-11 (1963).
(E) Federal law provides a somewhat simplified form of securities registration (tech-
nically a qualified exemption) for issues under $300,000. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b),
48 Stat. 75, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1958). An even simpler technique is available
if the offering is $50,000 or less. SEC Securities Act Rule 257, 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (1964).
The evolution of this provision, and various attempts to enlarge it, are presented in 1 Loss,
op. cit. supra note 86, at 605-09.
... Published figures permit only a rough guess at government costs. Texas figures do
not divide costs between registration and other aspects of administering the Securities Act
(such as licensing and enforcement). The former preponderates in most states, Loss &
Cowett, Blue Sky Law 57-58 (1958), and might be around 80% in Texas. For the fiscal
years 1961-62 and 1962-63, respectively, this would indicate costs of $173 and $255 per
registration application and 330 and 560 per thousand dollars of securities for which regis-
tration was sought. State Securities Board [Texas], Annual Report to the Governor [for]
Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 1963, at 6, 11. These costs are more than passed on to the
applicant for registration, who pays a fee of $1.00 per thousand. § 35.G. The United States
and many states have fees only 1/10 as large, i.e., 100 per thousand. If their costs are com-
parable to Texas, they are incurring substantial net expense in the administration of their
securities registration provisions.
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tionally. The solution to this problem is better education about and
administration of whatever laws are in force.
If we have little sympathy for the unwitting violator, we will have
still less for the witting but nonfraudulent violator who may not
think it is worth the trouble to register, e.g., in one of several states
where an offering is being made."'
The burden analysis gives no more exact basis for exemptions
than does the benefit analysis. However, the former does permit some
further differentiation. Since burden appears to vary inversely with
size of the issuer and size of the offering, these factors would be more
useful tests than number of purchasers.
5.3 Balance
Seen in terms like these, the ultimate policy job is balancing the
benefits against the burdens and finding the point at which the latter
outweigh the former; ideally, this is where exemptions should be
created.
One of the difficulties of policymakers in this area is the lack of
empirical or statistical evidence. Here are some of the questions it
would be useful to have answered. What is the volume and character
of small business financing, about which the last few pages have con-
jectured? What are the sources-institutions or individuals? Are the
individuals professional investors, business associates, friends, or un-
related? How extensively are broker-dealers and other intermediaries
used? What information and sales pitches are used? How close to
the business do the investors become, e.g., in terms of operation and
information? How do all these vary with the type and size of the
business, the size of the financing, and the later history of the busi-
ness? Have state-to-state differences in small offering exemptions had
any identifiable differences in impact? Are state laws in fact obeyed?
Even without the answers, a good general argument can be made
for the present small offering exemptions. It is a compound one: the
exemptions primarily eliminate registration which would be of no
benefit to many purchasers (because of their close relation to the
issuer or because of their general sophistication) and which would be
a considerable burden (economically and otherwise) to the smaller
issuer. Although large issuers may use the exemptions, they do so
mostly to purchasers too sophisticated or informed to need the pro-
tection of registration. And though small issuers undoubtedly use
them for sales to some persons who would profit from protection, the
. This argument is offered and rejected in Note, The Uniform Securities Act, 12 Stan.
L. Rev. 105, 148-49 (1959).
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burdens on such issuers probably would outweigh the benefits to the
buyers.
On the other hand, given a clearer idea of what justifies a small
offering exemption (or given the facts on which to make a sounder
judgment), a more precise exemption might well be possible. Until
we reach this stage, the present ones will prove useful and are likely
to cause little damage.
